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Abstract—The evolution of smart card technology provides
an interesting case study of the relationship and interactions
between security and business requirements. This paper maps
out the milestones for smart card technology, discussing at
each step the opportunities and challenges. The paper reviews
recently proposed innovative ownership/management models and
the security challenges associated with them. The paper concludes
with a discussion of possible future directions for the technology,
and the challenges these present.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Smart cards are the most widely deployed tamper-resistant
secure devices [1]. It is difficult to envisage performing the
mundane tasks of modern life without smart cards. A range
of private and governmental organisations have played an
important role in the development, promotion, and wide-scale
deployment of smart cards.
Smart card technology has enabled diverse organisations,
referred to as “Service Providers (SPs)”, to provide secure
services to their consumers. Along with their strong security
properties, the cards are very convenient for end users and
come at a reasonable cost to individual Service Providers
(SPs). The SPs not only get a secure product at modest
expense, but they can also use the card body for brand
exposure.
Technology sometimes evolves to support certain business
requirements, whereas on other occasions, technical inno-
vations appear that then need applications to exploit them.
Success is not always assured and an innovation may not
catch on, either because of difficulties with business models
or because it exceeds the requirements of the time [2]. Smart
card technology is no different: it has its success stories along
with excellent innovations that did not catch on.
This paper explores different milestones in the smart card’s
technological evolution and evaluates the successes and fail-
ures. Finally, the current opportunities and challenges faced
by smart card technology are considered.
A. Structure of the Paper
Section II presents a succinct history of smart card tech-
nology. Section III discusses the proposed security models
for smart card technology. In section IV, the current trends
in the smart card industry are discussed along with the
challenges and opportunities. In section V, possible future
directions are explored along with how these might change
the overall architecture of smart card technology. Conclusions
are presented in section VI.
II. SMART CARD EVOLUTION
This section explores the evolution of smart card platforms
from a single application platform to a feature-rich multiap-
plication platform.
A. Monoapplication Smart Cards
Early smart cards only supported a single application. The
application represented the services provided by the SP, who
acquired these cards from the card manufacturer and issued
them to their respective consumers. In this model, referred as
“Issuer Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (ICOM)”, SPs
buy the cards and in most instances give them to the consumers
(i.e. card users) free of cost.
Early monoapplication smart cards required the develop-
ment of the respective applications functionality as part of the
Smart Card Operating System (SCOS). The first monoappli-
cation smart cards were based on Monolithic SCOSs in which
applications were closely tied up with the SCOS code [3]. This
model required that the application developers have in-depth
understanding of how the SCOS worked.
Later, another concept termed the “generic soft mask” [4]
took centre stage. In the generic soft mask, a card manufacturer
implements a Smart Card Operating System (SCOS) on a non-
mutable memory on the smart card. This operating system is
independent of installed applications like banking or transport.
To support these applications, the card manufacturer imple-
ments Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) to facilitate
the requirements of individual applications. These APIs are
stored on a mutable memory rather than on a non-mutable
memory where traditionally the bulk of the SCOS was stored.
This innovation simplified the development of smart card
applications: card manufacturers proposed using generic soft
masks for different types of applications. Implementing the
concept of the generic soft mask requires a minimum oper-
ating system and some customized Application Programming
Interfaces (APIs) for any particular application.
The introduction of the soft mask also enabled smart card
developers to have a single smart card which had multi-
ple applications. These were fundamentally different from
multi-functional smart cards because each of the function-
alities/services had a separate application in the smart card.
One example of an initial soft mask-based multiple application
smart card is the French banking card. It had the old B0’
application [5], EMV [6] banking application and a French
(electronic) purse called Moneo [7], [8]. When a smart card
user presented his/her smart card at a terminal, the card first
checked whether or not the terminal supported EMV. If it did
not, then it could opt for the B0’ French banking application.
Although these smart cards had separate functional applica-
tions, we cannot term them true multiapplication smart cards
because of the rigidity of their architecture. Once these smart
cards were issued, not even the card issuers (i.e. SPs that issue
smart cards) could update them or install new applications.
B. Multiapplication Smart Cards
Multiapplication smart cards support the features listed
below [1], [4], [9], [10]:
1) A separate context for each application on the card (e.g.
storage and execution isolation), ensuring a secure and
reliable application segregation mechanism.
2) Post-issuance application installation, deletion, and man-
agement (update/modification).
3) The ability for terminals to select an application directly
and independently of other on-card applications.
4) The management, updating, modification, and deletion
of each application without affecting other applications.
5) Delegation of the management of an application to
an entity, which is not necessarily the card issuer. If
an application is managed by such an entity, then the
card issuer cannot access the application context. The
only possible authority a card issuer might have is to
block and/or remove the application without accessing
its contents.
6) Secure and reliable inter-application communication.
A large number of smart cards deployed today are single
task devices which can only execute one application at a time,
and do not support the simultaneous execution of multiple
applications. However, innovations in hardware design and in
the SCOS/platforms have begun to explore the concept of
multi-threading [11]. These developments will surely make
smart cards into powerful and secure computing devices which
can support different tasks concurrently.
The two main de-facto standards of multiapplication smart
cards are Java Card [11] and Multos [12], which are discussed
in subsequent sections. In addition, no discussion on multi-
application smart cards can be complete without discussing
the GlobalPlatform [13] specification as presented in section
II-B3.
1) MULTOS: In 1997, a consortium of companies
(MAOSCO) supported the development of an SCOS called
Multos [12], with one aim: to provide a high level of security
and reliability. They required a single operating system which
could be implemented on any silicon chip and which had
an application written for it that was independent of the
underlying hardware. Their vision anticipated the creation of a
multiapplication smart card. From the beginning, Multos was
developed as a secure multiapplication SCOS that achieved
ITSEC1 Assurance Level E6 [15] (comparable to the Common
Criteria EAL7 [16], [17]), which is the highest level attained
by any SCOS [1].
The Multos card architecture is illustrated in Figure 1. At
the top in Figure 1 is the application layer, which contains
three applications (namely A, B, and C); each application
has its own space, which is protected by the card’s firewall
mechanism. The next layer is the Application Abstract Ma-
chine (AAM), which also includes different APIs. The Multos
operating system presides over the hardware and provides
services such as communication, memory management, the
handling of loading and deleting of applications, together with
APDU commands and responses. At the bottom of the figure is
the hardware, which supports the SCOS. Functions that access
this layer are written in native language, but are accessed by
a fully specified virtual machine, which is the same no matter
what the hardware.
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Fig. 1. Generic representation of the Multos card architecture
The application installation and deletion mechanism pro-
posed by the Multos specification has a stringent and cen-
tralised architecture [18]. Every time an application is to be
installed, an application provider will request an Applica-
tion Load Certificate from the Multos Certification Authority
through the appropriate card issuer. Because it has such a
stringent architecture Multos is not considered the industry’s
leading architecture. This title goes to the Java Card technol-
ogy, which has proliferated in the smart card industry because
of its flexibility and robustness, and its readily available pool
of experienced developers.
2) Java Card: It has progressed from the initial release
which supported only limited functionality (i.e. primitive data
types such as Boolean, byte and short) to the more recently
released Java Card specification 3.0 [11] which includes the
TCP/IP stack [19] along with SSL/TLS [20] and HTTP [21]
/HTTPS [11], [22], [23]. The Java Card can behave as an
internet device in either a server or client capacity. The
1Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) is an inter-
national security assurance evaluation criteria [14].
architecture of a Java Card is illustrated in Figure 2 and is
described below:
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Fig. 2. Generic representation of the Java Card 3 architecture
In comparison to Multos, Java Card is better termed a
platform rather than an operating system. Due to this distinc-
tion, above the smart card hardware layer, a native operating
system is placed that is developed by each card manufacturer
to support its implementation of the Java Card Virtual Machine
(JCVM). Furthermore, as Java-based code might take longer to
execute than the native code, the native method segment is the
crucial point for implementing the cryptographic algorithms.
Above this layer, we have the Java Card Runtime Environment
(JCRE), which provides different services in the shape of Ap-
plication Programming Interfaces (APIs) and System Classes
to the residing applications. The Java Card APIs provide a
well-structured framework to access the system-level services
in a secure and reliable manner. The segregation on a Java
Card between platform-application and application-application
is enforced by the Java Card firewall.
The Java Card specification leaves decisions regarding the
mechanism for installing, deleting, updating, and managing
multiple applications on a smart card to the card manufacturer.
The industry appreciated this move, as it allowed greater
flexibility than Multos, which is rigid in comparison. How-
ever, it was soon realised that for application management
tasks it would be beneficial for all the players in the smart
card industry to have a unified specification. The proposed
application management framework came in the form of the
GlobalPlatform card specification, which is the topic of the
next section.
3) GlobalPlatform: Towards the end of the 1990s, smart
card technology was being adopted on a large scale. It was
soon realised by card manufacturers, card issuers, and applica-
tion providers that to manage such a complex and technically
complicated infrastructure, it would be beneficial to share a
unified and universal card management system which freed
them from the demands of the smart card hardware, platform,
application service and card issuer’s requirements. Visa gave
the impetus to this idea by transferring their Open Platform
initiative to a consortium of card issuers, application providers,
and smart card manufacturers, later known as GlobalPlatform.
The GlobalPlatform card specification is a card architecture-
neutral specification which does not require/specify any par-
ticular Runtime Environment (RTE). However, at present most
smart cards which support the GlobalPlatform specifications
actually call for a Java Card Runtime Environment (JCRE).
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Fig. 3. Generic representation of the GlobalPlatform card architecture
The architecture illustrated in Figure 3 has applications
from the card issuer, application providers (partners of the
card issuer) and a global service application, which provides
services to all the applications installed on the smart card. The
applications are managed and controlled by the mechanism of
security domains. A security domain has an association with
one of the application(s) via which it manages and enforces
the security policies of the owner of the domain. The security
domain also provides separate cryptographic keys to the card
issuer and the application providers to permit management
of their respective domains/applications. The security domain
also manages key handling, encryption, decryption, digital
signature, and the verification of (hosted) applications (i.e.
only at the time of installation [13], [24]). The card issuer
generates the security domain (application domain) on the card
and then gives control of the application domains to the card
issuer’s partners (application providers). These application
providers can then manage their applications independently
of the card issuer’s involvement.
The OPEN framework defined in the GlobalPlatform spec-
ification handles/controls the downloading and installation of
applications. The Trusted framework enables different services
such as inter-application communications; however, the “Glob-
alPlatform Card Security Requirement Specification” [25]
states that GlobalPlatform relies on the underlying platform’s
(e.g. Java Card) implementation of the firewall mechanism.
The crucial component of the GlobalPlatform card specifica-
tion is termed the Card Manager. This is a generic term used
for such services as OPEN, the issuer security domain and
Cardholder verification method services. The Card Manager
actively controls the smart card environment. Furthermore,
the smart card issuer cannot access any of the application
domains because they are protected by the cryptographic keys
(access keys) and these keys are shared only between an
application domain and an application provider. However, if
a particular application provider violates the agreement with
the card issuer, or they no longer have a partnership to
provide services, then the card issuer can block or delete the
application provider’s application.
III. SECURITY MODELS FOR MULTIAPPLICATION SMART
CARDS
This section discusses different security models that have
been proposed for smart card deployments [26].
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Fig. 4. Overview of the Issuer Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (ICOM)
A. Issuer Centric Smart Card Ownership Model
In Figure 4, smart card issuers are companies (e.g. in the
banking, transport and telecom sectors), which use smart cards
to provide services to their customers. The card issuers order
smart cards from a card manufacturer. The card manufacturer
delivers them to the card issuer or in some cases posts the
ordered smart cards directly to the users (on behalf of the
respective card issuer), which in turn issues them to individual
cardholders. A cardholder presents her smart card at a Service
Access Point (SAP) to use the services provided by the card
issuer. A SAP can be an ATM (Automated Teller Machine), a
mobile phone or a simple card reader; it acts as a gateway to
a card issuer’s services.
In this framework, the control of the issued smart cards
lies with the card issuer, who decides what application(s)
will be installed on the cards. If a card issuer has a business
agreement with any other company, then the cardholder may
get a smart card with multiple applications, as in the case
of the Barclaycard’s OnePulse card [27]. Barclaycard2 is the
card issuer and it has an established business relationship
with Transport for London3 (issuer of Oyster cards [28]).
Therefore, with its bankcard, Barclays provides the Oyster
card functionality.
The ICOM requires a trusted centralised authority to be set
up which will have supervisory authority over smart cards.
This centralised authority can be either the card issuer or a
certifying authority. For convenience, we use the term card
issuer to refer to any centralised authority in regard to the
ICOM. The role of the authority is to enforce the security
policy, which enables all the applications on a smart card
to behave in a predefined manner. The predefined manner is
negotiated between the application provider concerned and the
card issuer. This agreement defines the parameters under which
the application provider may access different services on the
card issuer’s smart cards. Furthermore, the card issuer will
have the authority to grant or deny access to any particular
application provider.
2Barclaycard: Barclaycard is a trading name for the banking card sector of
Barclays Bank PLC, United Kingdom.
3Transport for London (TfL) is a publicly owned company that provides
transport services to Greater London, United Kingdom.
Smart cards in the ICOM are acquired by the card issuer,
which is in a position to choose their operational and security
functionality. This gives assurance to the purchasing company
(the card issuer) that the smart cards that carry its applica-
tions are secure to their required standard. If the card issuer
required a third party evaluation of the smart card product, the
card manufacturer might provide the Common Criteria [17]
evaluation certificate (a paper based certificate) as a means of
assurance.
To summarise the ICOM framework, the privileges or rights
that a card issuer receives as part of the ICOM are listed below:
1) Privilege to install an application.
2) Privilege to delete an application.
3) Control over card issuance to individual users. This
enables the issuers to decide who receives their smart
cards (and effectively control their application).
4) Power to define the security and operational require-
ments for the smart cards.
5) Enforcement of the security policy.
6) Control over who can access their services using the
issued smart cards.
The security and operational assumptions discussed above
are the cornerstones of the ICOM.
B. Certificate Based
In this model, a third party will have the oversight of the
smart card’s security policy that both the card issuer (e.g. SP)
and application providers have to abide by.
C. Open Card
In this approach, the customers would take the role of
card issuer and acquire (blank) smart cards from a card
manufacturer. A customer would then acquire an application
from an organisation (e.g. bank, telecom and transport, etc.)
and install this onto his or her smart card. This approach was
not considered a serious contender as organisations may not
trust the customer and might not have behaviour guarantees
on the smart card platform.
D. Who took the Day?
Smart cards are traditionally deployed in inherently insecure
environments with the strong assumption that their users might
have malign intent. In such an environment, multiapplica-
tion smart cards with applications from different application
providers (i.e. SPs) prompted debate over which security
policy (discussed above) should be adopted.
As noted by M’Chirgui [2], the smart card industry’s rapid
proliferation was due to the adoption of the coopetition attitude
towards the product and market; as noted for other high-tech
industries. The concept of coopetition can be described as two
individuals (companies) who cooperate with each other to cook
a pie (establish a market) and then they compete with each
other to take the biggest share of it. Examples of coopetition
include EMV [6], GlobalPlatform [13], and Java Card [11]
specification. However, a similar attitude was not apparent for
the deployment of the multiapplication smart card initiative
for a diverse set of reasons. Following are a few of the major
issues that contributed to the deceleration of the convergence
of diverse services on a single device.
1) Smart Card Control (Ownership)
2) Marketing Potential
3) Customer Loyalty
4) Customer Relationship Management
5) Potential Revenue Source
The above-mentioned reasons may overly simplify the dy-
namics that led to the deceleration of the multiapplication
smart card initiative. Nevertheless they played their role, and
recently these issues have returned, as the concept of having
multiapplication applications on a single device is gaining
momentum.
IV. CURRENT TRENDS IN MULTIAPPLICATION SMART
CARDS
In recent years, the smart card industry has trialled different
approaches to the deployment of smart card-based services
using mobile handsets. This section discusses the Near Field
Communication technology and associated deployment archi-
tecture referred to as Trusted Services Manager (TSM).
A. Near Field Communication
The most important innovation that has influenced smart
card technology in recent years is Near Field Communication
(NFC), which enables a mobile phone to emulate a contact-
less smart card [29]. This allows NFC-enabled mobile phones
to perform contact-less card transaction on the existing smart
card infrastructure (i.e., contact-less smart card terminals [1]).
Therefore, it does not require any modification on the in-
frastructure side of the smart card service ecosystem. The
only change is that a user’s mobile phone acts as a contact-
less smart card and from terminal’s point of reference it
communicates on a contact-less interface with a device that
can be a traditional smart card or a mobile phone. The NFC
trails are being carried out in 38 countries around the world
[30].
In addition to the developments taking place in terms
of NFC and its implications for the traditional smart card
industry, smart card users cannot be isolated from the concept
referred to as the “iPhone effect”. Installing an application
onto a mobile was possible even before the iPhone came to
market. However, the iPhone made it consumer-friendly; an
average customer can easily navigate, search, and install third
party software [31]. In addition, the application developers do
not have to negotiate with the mobile operators to download
their applications onto the iPhone. Furthermore, Apple has
managed to remain in the sales loop by charging a percentage
on application sales directly to the application developers.
Finally, mobile operators got the opportunity to sell data plans
and generate revenue from the data usage.
With a growing and ever-younger consumer base that uses
mobile phones for a multitude of purposes [32], it is obvious
that the smart card service sector could also harness the plat-
form to reduce their investment (i.e. purchasing of new smart
cards), decrease roll-out time for new services, and remain
competitive. An example of the competitive challenge faced by
the traditional smart card industry is mobile payment systems;
there are a number of smart phone Apps (i.e. Starbucks Apps
for Blackberry and iPhone, and PayPal App, etc.) that a user
can download onto their mobile phones and then can use them
to pay for different services.
The multiapplication smart card initiative has matured to
a level where it can be considered as a secure, reliable and
viable platform. The convergence of different services on to a
single device might be considered a natural next step in smart
card evolution. However, how successful this might be is still
open to debate. The next section discusses the proposed (and
trialled) business models for the NFC based services roll-out.
B. Trusted Service Manager (TSM)
A Trusted Service Manager (TSM) is an entity that manages
the collaborative architecture in which different application
providers share a platform4. The TSM can be a card issuer
or a third party to whom the card management tasks [33],
[34] are being delegated by the scheme participants (e.g. card
issuer and application providers). In current proposals a TSM
can be: a) a Mobile Network Operation (MNO) [34], [35], b)
a Card Issuing Bank (CIS) [36], [37] or c) A neutral third
party.
No matter who takes the role of the TSM in a particular
roll out, an ownership architecture has to be decided among
the scheme participants. Some of the possible architectures
listed in the literature [33]–[35], [38]–[40] are described in
the subsequent sections.
1) Hotel Architecture: In this architecture, the card issuer
owns the smart cards and either it can act as a TSM to control
and manage the architecture or give it to a neutral third party.
The TSM whose role is to control and manage the spaces
(i.e. can be considered as rooms in a hotel); issues them to
any requesting application providers. The lease of individual
spaces can be time/space dependent. The application providers
can access their spaces and utilise them according to the terms
and conditions set by the TSM. The TSM will also have
access to individual spaces; so it means that the keys that
are used to manage individual spaces in the scheme are with
an application provider that is using that space and the TSM.
The maintenance of individual spaces can be managed by the
TSM and might also include managing the customer relations
of the individual application providers.
This architecture is stringent in terms of what an application
provider can and cannot do with the allocated space. The
scheme manager (i.e. TSM) can evict any application provider
from the smart card, along with having the right to access these
spaces.
4Platform: The term platform in context of the TSM refers to the secure
elements present in a mobile phone. Secure elements can be Universal
Integrated Circuit (UICC), embedded secure element, and Secure Memory
Card [33].
2) Rental Architecture: This model is similar to the hotel
architecture in many aspects, but the main difference is that
the TSM issues a lease to application providers and this lease
assigns the space on the smart card along with cryptographic
keys to manage it. The TSM has access to these keys and they
will be independently managed by the individual application
providers. The TSM still has the authority to evict any appli-
cation from the smart card but they do not have the right to
access the memory space allocated to individual application
providers. The lease in rental architecture is also time/space
dependent but usually it is longer than the one issued in a
hotel architecture.
The maintenance of individual spaces is delegated to indi-
vidual application providers. In addition, in individual leases
can have different sets of rules and regulations depending upon
the TSM and respective application providers discretion. This
architecture gives control of the smart card space to individual
application providers.
3) Permanent Ownership Architecture: Individual spaces
are permanently owned by scheme participants. Its similar to
a building comprised of flats that are individually owned by
the residents. There is a set of rules and regulations that are
agreed among the scheme participants. As long as individual
application providers abide by these rules and regulations they
can utilise the space that they own. For security, reliability, and
operational management the scheme participants can either
choose one entity among themselves or hire a third party. The
entity that would perform these duties is designated the TSM.
In this scheme no single entity can evict other entity, unless
that entity has broken the agreed rules and regulations, and all
other participants agree in principle.
V. POSSIBLE FUTURE DIRECTION FOR MULTIAPPLICATION
SMART CARDS
This section discusses proposals for the future of smart card
technology.
A. GlobalPlatform Consumer-Centric Smart Cards
This model enables users to acquire a secure token (e.g.
smart card) from any provider (e.g card manufacturer and/or
card issuer) and then manage the device as they please
[49]. The proposed model is based on the GlobalPlatform
architecture with the application installation/deletion privilege
given to the users via a token provider. The proposed new
model is similar to the User Centric Smart Card Ownership
Model (UCOM) [41]. Therefore, instead of detailing the
GlobalPlatform model, the UCOM is described in the next
section. In the rest of this paper, the term consumer/user centric
smart card refers to GlobalPlatform Consumer-Centric and
User Centric Smart Cards.
B. User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (UCOM)
The architecture of the User Centric Smart Card Ownership
Model (UCOM) supports smart card ownership being with
the cards user. The term ownership does not imply that the
cardholder owns the platform as a card issuer would in the
Fig. 5. Generic Overview of User Centric Smart Card Model (UCOM)
ICOM or TSM architectures. It implies that the user has the
“freedom of choice” [41] to install or delete any application
they require on their smart card. The card issuers or application
providers in the ICOM or TSM architecture are termed Service
Providers in the UCOM. A Service Provider (SP) is an organ-
isation that will develop a smart card-based application and
then issue its customers with unique credentials to download
its application(s) directly to their respective smart cards [42].
As shown in Figure 6, a card issuer acquires a UCOM-
supported smart card referred as a User Centric Smart Card
(UCSC) from a card manufacturer. At this stage, the card
might be a blank card under default ownership. The default
ownership means that its under the ownership of the card
manufacturer. The cardholder initiates ownership transfer to
him or herself and then can present this card to a SP to
request their applications. The SP would decide the lease of the
applications depending upon their Application Lease Policy
(ALP) [42] which basically states the minimum security and
operation requirements a smart card has to meet to get the
lease. Only after the smart card satisfies the lease requirement
of the SP [43], can the application be downloaded onto it. The
cardholder is not involved in this process except for initiating
the request for the application lease.
1) Why User Centric Smart Card Ownership: UCOM
architecture is different from the Open Card initiative [45],
multi-functional smart card [5] or virtual smart card (applica-
tions) [46]. The UCOM is in fact an ownership model rather
than a complete platform or smart card operating system. To
support UCOM requirements and services [41], the existing
well-defined and studied architectures (e.g. Java Card [11],
Multos [12], and GlobalPlatform [13]) are being modified [47]
so they can efficiently support the user’s ownership. Therefore,
the main ingredients to support a user’s ownership in a secure,
reliable, flexible and ubiquitous way are already there. The
only thing UCOM has done is to bring them together to
support the concept of user-owned security devices (namely
smart cards or secure element). The argument that an SP has
to trust a cardholder before issuing its application is not valid
[43] as the application lease is under the sole discretion of
the respective SP. In addition, only after gaining assurance
and validation that the smart card in question supports its
requirements will it lease the application [44]. Therefore, the
SP has to establish trust in the user’s smart card and not
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Fig. 6. Coopetitive Architecture’s Smart Card Ecosystem
the user. It is the smart card that has to provide security
and reliability assurance; whereas, the respective user can
have malign intentions. A valid argument can be made that
the UCOM architecture will only bring more complexity or
complicate the security-sensitive smart card industry. It is
true that the UCOM proposals do require some modification
to the existing smart card platform but not to the services
architecture (i.e. ATMs in banking, or turnstile terminal for
transport services) .
C. Coopetitive Smart Cards
The ecosystem of a coopetitive architecture is illustrated in
Figure 6. At its centre there are three main entities; smart card
issuer, cardholder and smart card. The card issuer (or TSM)
would issue smart cards to its respective customers. As a card
issuer they would have their application pre-installed on to the
smart card. The cardholder would have the choice to install or
delete any application they require, except for the card issuer’s
application(s). The management of the smart card application
installation, deletion, and application/card lifecyle is handled
by the Platform Manager (PM). It helps both the card issuer
and the cardholder to perform their sanctioned tasks.
As an example, consider a scenario in which a user en-
rols into the multiapplication smart card service architecture
through a Mobile Network Operator (MNO). As a customer
of the MNO, the user can receive an NFC-enabled mobile
phone (under a fixed period contract) and secure element(s)
that support multiapplication architecture. As per current ar-
chitecture, the MNO subsidises the mobile phone in return for
a fixed-period contract with its customers. The phone is under
MNO lock and it can only be used on the issuing MNO’s
network. At the end of the contract, the customer can request
the relevant MNO to unlock the mobile phone. The acquired
secure element(s) would have the MNO’s application installed
by default. In addition, if the user is a customer of any other
organisations that are associated partners with the MNO in
the TSM scheme, then he or she may get their applications
pre-installed on the secure element. The issuer secure element
would enable the user to request installation or deletion of
any application he or she requires, except for the MNO’s
application. At the end of the contract the MNO would not
only unlock the mobile phone but also the TSM. From this
point forward, the user can either use the secure element under
UCOM architecture or register their secure element with any
other TSM (or continue with the original MNO).
Similarly, other entities like banks, transport operators,
smart card and mobile phone manufacturers, or independent
third parties can participate by offering competitive products
that adhere to the coopetitive architecture. The security and
reliability of the coopetitive smart cards would be a key
issue which is dealt with separately in the ICOM and UCOM
scenarios. However, it is likely that further work would only
strength the contribution that an open and dynamic system can
bring to the multiapplication smart card architecture.
The fundamental attributes of the coopetitive architecture
for multiapplication smart cards are listed below.
1) The scheme manager (TSM) would enable the provision
for cardholders to request installation or deletion of any
applications as they require.
2) To provide privacy to the cardholders, the applications
that they request to install or delete would not be
revealed to the respective TSM, unless the application
in question is from an associate of the TSM. In that case
the TSM would be notified of installation and deletion.
For any independent entity (not related to the respective
TSM), the identity of the application would be revealed
to the TSM.
3) The security and reliability of the platform has to be
decentralised. In scenarios where a cardholder does not
want to reveal who is the active TSM of the card,
the relevant smart card would still be able to provide
security assurance and validations in an unlinkable way.
The unlinkability relates to a mechanism that does not
rely on the TSM, but on an independent third party’s
evaluation (i.e. Common Criteria Evaluations [17], [43],
[44]). The property of the unlinkability would be that
application providers that did not belong to the respec-
tive TSM would not know whether the requesting user
was with a particular TSM or not. Similarly, the TSM
should not know whose application is being requested
to be installed or deleted from the secure element.
4) The cardholder should be given the choice to change
the TSM if they require after meeting the terms and
conditions of the original TSM. This would enable
cardholders to move to TSMs that they consider provide
them with the best service. Obviously, the original TSM
has made an investment in the platform that is issued to
the cardholder. Therefore, a cardholder would have to
honour any terms and conditions that he or she agreed
to at the time of acquiring the secure element.
5) If a cardholder does not want to be with any of the
TSMs, then the framework should move back to default
UCOM architectures. Similarly, the TSMs would also
have the choice to remove the privileges of a cardholder
to install or delete applications, if the cardholder does
not conform to the TSM’s terms and conditions.
D. User Centric Tamper-Resistant Device
The motivation for having a generic tamper-resistant device
that is under the control of its user rather than a centralised
authority comes from three distinct but interrelated computing
fields: smart cards, mobile platforms, and traditional Per-
sonal Computers. The User Centric Tamper-Resistant Device
(UCTD) provides an underlying architecture that is secure,
reliable, and flexible across different computing domains. A
user can use her UCTD as a smart card device, and to secure
her applications/communications on her mobile device and/or
laptop. This proposal combines the security and privacy-
preserving architecture across three computing fields with a
single device architecture.
The multiapplication smart card architecture has the poten-
tial to serve as the underlying framework for the UCTD. The
crucial point that has to be taken into account is that smart card
architecture is traditionally under stringent centralised con-
trol, whereas the UCTD requires a more diverse architecture
which also accommodates the user’s ownership. Therefore, the
concept of the User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model
(UCOM) becomes synonymous with the UCTD. In addition to
the UCOM framework for smart cards, for the UCTD initiative
the form factor of smart cards is also diversified as shown in
Figure 7.
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Fig. 7. Illustration of UCTD form factors, application areas, and industry
sectors
E. Technical Challenges
By opening up the smart card platform, the traditional
security architecture might not remain valid. For this reason,
the smart card platform has to be improved to keep up with
developments in associated computing environments.
Features like multi-threading, Web servers for smart cards,
and high speed I/O will no doubt make smart card technology
the generic security device of the future but this also poses
new security challenges. The future smart card architecture has
to implement effective execution time bytecode verification.
In addition, an advance runtime protection mechanism is
necessary to avoid faults and/or combined attacks.
The smart cards of the future, if they take the path of
consumer-centric or user-centric smart cards, would require
on-demand security evaluation and validation mechanisms.
These mechanisms will enable the application providers to
verify that the smart card is secure for their respective applica-
tions. The smart card firewall mechanism (application sharing
mechanism) also requires refinement to cope with the dynamic
nature of future smart cards - having a robust design to avoid
feature interaction problems. The application installation and
deletion process has to be redesigned to bring it in line with
the dynamic nature of the future proposals for smart card
technology.
F. Business Challenges
The FIPR (Foundation for Information Policy Research)
published a white paper [48] in 1999, putting forward the
notion that multiapplication smart cards are a bad idea. One of
the big issues was the management of individual applications,
independent of the control of the card issuer. In addition,
there was the problem of what would happen if one of the
applications on a multiapplication smart card was insecure
— making the whole platform insecure. Since then, smart
card technology has come a long way. However, business
issues still need to be sorted out before TSM or consumer/user
centric smart cards can become a reality. These business
issues are related to the point discussed in section III-D.
TSM and consumer/user centric models are trying to address
these business issues but the uptake is slow. Once the TSM
architecture matures and is deployed to a substantial mass, it
will pave the way for the consumer/user centric models.
VI. CONCLUSION
Smart card technology has come a long way from a monoap-
plication platform to the present multi-threading environment.
The wide-scale adoption of smart card technology is evidence
of its merit. The technology has matured to a point where
it has the ability to break out of the traditional applications
and become a cross-computing platform security and privacy-
preserving device. To reach this goal, substantial improve-
ments and modifications are required but it seems that smart
card technology has what it takes to be a de-facto security and
privacy-preserving device for a diverse range of applications
running on heterogeneous platforms.
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